State of Oregon: World War II (2024)

Real Threats to Oregon

Racism and public pressure played key roles in the decision to remove people of Japanese descent from the West Coast. But officials weighed other factors as well. The threat of Japanese attack convinced leaders to designate a broad swath of territory along the Pacific Coast as a military theater of operations. Once that decision was made, it became easier to justify the removal of Japanese Americans, even loyal ones, in an effort to "simplify" the potentially dangerous military situation in the event that bombs fell. Officials could "not permit the risk of putting an unassimilated or partly assimilated people to an unpredictable test during an invasion by an army of their own race."Footnote 1 Despite fears, an invasion never materialized. But, attacks did occur, including the shelling of Fort Stevens, two aerial bomb runs near Brookings, and balloon bombs such as the one that killed 6near Bly.

Japanese Submarine Shells Fort Stevens

Events in Japan played a part in triggering the shelling of Fort Stevens near Astoria in 1942. In April, sixteen U.S. Army B-25 bombers managed to attack the Japanese home islands after being launched from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Hornet. The "Doolittle Raid," named for its leader, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle, was the most audacious operation undertaken by the United States in the young Pacific War. Conceived as a diversion that would also boost American and Allied morale, the raid generated strategic benefits that far outweighed its goals. Though it resulted in no tactical advantage, the shock of the attack left the Japanese high command deeply embarrassed. ( Watch a newsreel report about the Doolittle Raid - via YouTube​)

Among their responses, Japanese military leaders adjusted their forces in the Pacific and dispatched a number of I-class long-range submarines across the Pacific to raid shipping off the American coast. The Japanese high command ordered submarines I-25 and I-26 to the Pacific Northwest to find and attack naval vessels headed to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. On June 20, 1942, I-26 shelled the lighthouse at Estevan Point on Vancouver Island and I-25 torpedoed and shelled the freighter S.S. Fort Camosun off Cape Flattery. The freighter did not sink and rescuers towed it to safety in Neah Bay.

The next evening I-25 came in close to the coast through a fishing fleet to avoid minefields off the Columbia River and took position near Fort Stevens. The crew fired its 5.5 inch deck gun at the shore. Japanese Commander Meiji Tagami, who thought he was firing at a submarine base, later recalled: "In shooting at the land I did not use any gunsight at all--just shot." Meanwhile, at the fort the shots rang out as First Sergeant Lawrence Rude saw nothing but confusion: "I opened the door of my room and stood there in my drawers cussing at the guys to shut up. Some nut yells back that the Japs are shooting at us and then tore out of the barracks. It was a real madhouse."Footnote 2

Despite the confusion, soldiers at the fort soon manned their guns and searchlights, and lookouts could see the submarine firing in the distance. But the enemy ship was inaccurately determined to be out of range, and the artillerymen never received permission to return fire. The fort's commander later claimed he didn't want to give away the precise location of the defenses to the enemy.

The I-25's shells left craters in the beach and marshland around Battery Russell at the fort, damaging only the backstop of the baseball diamond about 70 to 80 yards from the facility's big guns. A shell fragment also nicked a power line, causing it to fail later. Casualties amounted to one soldier who cut his head rushing to his battle station. By about midnight the attack ended and the enemy vessel sailed off to the west and north. While the submarine fired 17 shells, witnesses on land only heard between 9 and 14 rounds. Experts surmised that some shells might have been duds or fallen into the sea. Despite causingno significant damage, the attack certainly raised awareness of the threat of future strikes and went into the history books as the only hostile shelling of a military base on the U.S. mainland during World War II and the first since the War of 1812.

Fallout from the attack in the Astoria area included demands from the local civilian population that clear warnings be given in the event of future shellings. As it was, civilian defense officials had no machineryto warn the population to take precautions. Moreover, the sounds of shell fire could be misleading as Clatsop County Defense Council Coordinator D.J. Lewis complained: "I personally heard every shell that was fired and recognized it for shellfire, but it certainly was not sufficiently alarming to cause me to get out of bed. What assurances have we that it wasn't practice at any of the Army or Navy posts around here, inasmuch as this has been known to happen?"Footnote 3 In the end, military and civilian defense officials agreed to communicate more closely to warn citizens of an attack.

Japanese Plane Bombs Oregon Coast

Oregon made national headlines a few months later in two incidents that went down as the first aerial bombing of the United States mainland by a foreign power. Again the Japanese submarine I-25 was the source of the trouble. On Sept. 9, 1942 Japanese pilot Nobuo Fujita catapulted from the I-25 near the coast of southern Oregon aboard a seaplane and headed east toward Mt. Emily. His mission was to drop an incendiary (fire) bomb on the thick forest and cause a massive fire that would shock Americans and divert resources from fighting the war. Once over forested land, Fujita released the bomb, which struck leaving a crater about three feet in diameter and about one foot deep.

Meanwhile on the ground, forest service lookout Howard "Razz" Gardner watched the attack unfold. Looking into the dark skies just before dawn, Gardner heard what sounded to be a Model A Ford backfiring. Scanning the foggy skies, he caught glimpse of a small airplane circling above and called to the ranger station to report it. The operator who took the report assumedit was one of many patrol planes that passed up and down the coast.

Later as the fog lifted, Gardner spotted smoke and immediately sounded the alarm and called for help. He assumed the smoke was a result of lightning from a strong electrical storm the day before. After gathering equipment, he took off on a short cut through rugged terrain in the direction of the fire and was later joined by a coworker. They arrived at the scene where they found smoldering fires covering a circular area about 50 to 75 feet across. They quickly controlled the fires, examined the area, and found a crater at the center that showed signs of intense heat, including fused earth and rocks that resembled lava.

According to a later report: "The bomb in falling had struck a fir tree about six inches in diameter, much as though lightning had struck it, and the fin of the bomb had sheared off a tan oak tree five inches in diameter as cleanly as though it had been done with a heavy and sharp axe. Fragments of the bomb had been scattered over a radius of about 100 feet, one of the blazing pieces lodging in a decayed stub, setting it afire."Footnote 4 After finding fragments of metal casings and thermite pellets, it was concluded that a bomb had caused the damage but it was assumed that it had been dropped accidentally by an American plane.

The next day searchers found the bomb nose cone and a casing fragment with Japanese markings, confirming the identity. They gathered up the fragments and pellets, totaling about 60 pounds, and hauled them out for delivery to the Army lieutenant in charge of the Gold Beach detachment. Soon Army and FBI officials were conducting intensive interviews and swearing participants to secrecy. Meanwhile, the small town of Brookings to the south was buzzing with rumors. Residents heard of the bombing but could only speculate on details. Despite their efforts at secrecy, officials watched helplessly as newspapers across the country ran stories that included more details than the government had hoped to release. A second, similar seaplane attack at the end of September yielded similar results. If the forest had been as dry as normal for that time of year, the Japanese plan might have worked, leaving forest fires that diverted hundreds of fire fighters and large amounts of money from the war effort while triggering panic in the population.

State Defense Council officials used the news to support their efforts to raise awareness about the possibility of enemy attack. State coordinator Jerrold Owen put it bluntly: "Morale among civilian defense workers was getting low because many of them believed 'it can't happen here.' Well, it did happen last Wednesday, so the workers can see now just what they are working for. We have been praying for just such an attack to shake people out of their lethargy." He went on to predict that "undoubtedly this small foray is but a forerunner of what may be expected in the future. Similar phosphorus bombs dropped on inflammable wooden buildings may be expected to cause extensive fires..." In response, Owen reminded readers that thousands of Oregonians had been training for a year to respond effectively to the threat posed by incendiary bombs. Footnote ⁵